Great post. You now have me thinking about this war the U.S. is waging against Iran in terms of price theory.
From a strictly government standpoint, the United States is paying a higher immediate strategic opportunity cost regarding its global superpower posture, while Iran's government faces a far higher existential opportunity cost regarding state survival and the complete drainage of its long-term national wealth.
Yes, one of the things that Wittman does in his paper is that he assumes symmetry between the combatants. The worst outcome they could conceivably end up with is unconditional surrender. However, if we think about the wars fought since the end of WWII, they are often wars between major powers, like the U.S. and the former Soviet Union, and smaller adversaries. In wars of that type, unconditional surrender might be the worst attainable outcome for the smaller side. However, that doesn't seem to be the relevant threat to the major power since one would expect their worst attainable outcome would be a decline in major power status. In Wittman's model, this would tend to contract the negotiating space. That would seem to have an ambiguous affect on whether or not the war ends quickly. On the one hand, but contract the negotiating space, the major power will tend to have a steeper expected utility function. All else equal, this will tend to make the conflict shorter. However, this depends on the strategy followed by both sides.
In the U.S./Iran scenario, for example, the aggressive start to the conflict was meant to provoke a negotiation. However, like Wittman's model predicts, although these strikes should make Iran more likely to negotiate, the success of those initial strikes and attacks also emboldened the decision-makers in the U.S. by raising the expected benefits of warfare. Evidently, this prevented an agreement from taking place.
Furthermore, once the U.S. switched to a naval blockade strategy, this reduced the intensity of the war. Wittman's model predicts that this makes successful negotiations less likely and therefore prolongs the conflict. If you recall, in those early days, President Trump was repeatedly making pronouncements about a peace deal and negotiations. Since moving to a blockade strategy, such pronouncements have largely disappeared. Now, his public statements are largely about the success of the blockade with no urgency to negotiate. That is what Wittman's model would predict.
Not only does Wittman’s model predict a prolonged confrontation, so does the Powell Doctrine.
The Powell Doctrine states that the United States should only deploy military force as a last resort and, when doing so, must utilize overwhelming, decisive strength rather than incremental escalation to achieve a swift victory. Formulated by General Colin Powell in the wake of the Vietnam War, the doctrine serves as a strict checklist to prevent the nation from slipping into open-ended, poorly defined quagmires.
The U.S. has actually lowered Iran’s opportunity cost by moving to a blockade. This also means that our objectives have shifted from a clear strategy of mass destruction (to bring Iran to the negotiating table) to something less destructive and ambiguous (no clear endgame).
Great post. You now have me thinking about this war the U.S. is waging against Iran in terms of price theory.
From a strictly government standpoint, the United States is paying a higher immediate strategic opportunity cost regarding its global superpower posture, while Iran's government faces a far higher existential opportunity cost regarding state survival and the complete drainage of its long-term national wealth.
Do you care to weigh in?
Yes, one of the things that Wittman does in his paper is that he assumes symmetry between the combatants. The worst outcome they could conceivably end up with is unconditional surrender. However, if we think about the wars fought since the end of WWII, they are often wars between major powers, like the U.S. and the former Soviet Union, and smaller adversaries. In wars of that type, unconditional surrender might be the worst attainable outcome for the smaller side. However, that doesn't seem to be the relevant threat to the major power since one would expect their worst attainable outcome would be a decline in major power status. In Wittman's model, this would tend to contract the negotiating space. That would seem to have an ambiguous affect on whether or not the war ends quickly. On the one hand, but contract the negotiating space, the major power will tend to have a steeper expected utility function. All else equal, this will tend to make the conflict shorter. However, this depends on the strategy followed by both sides.
In the U.S./Iran scenario, for example, the aggressive start to the conflict was meant to provoke a negotiation. However, like Wittman's model predicts, although these strikes should make Iran more likely to negotiate, the success of those initial strikes and attacks also emboldened the decision-makers in the U.S. by raising the expected benefits of warfare. Evidently, this prevented an agreement from taking place.
Furthermore, once the U.S. switched to a naval blockade strategy, this reduced the intensity of the war. Wittman's model predicts that this makes successful negotiations less likely and therefore prolongs the conflict. If you recall, in those early days, President Trump was repeatedly making pronouncements about a peace deal and negotiations. Since moving to a blockade strategy, such pronouncements have largely disappeared. Now, his public statements are largely about the success of the blockade with no urgency to negotiate. That is what Wittman's model would predict.
Not only does Wittman’s model predict a prolonged confrontation, so does the Powell Doctrine.
The Powell Doctrine states that the United States should only deploy military force as a last resort and, when doing so, must utilize overwhelming, decisive strength rather than incremental escalation to achieve a swift victory. Formulated by General Colin Powell in the wake of the Vietnam War, the doctrine serves as a strict checklist to prevent the nation from slipping into open-ended, poorly defined quagmires.
The U.S. has actually lowered Iran’s opportunity cost by moving to a blockade. This also means that our objectives have shifted from a clear strategy of mass destruction (to bring Iran to the negotiating table) to something less destructive and ambiguous (no clear endgame).
Thank you!