Potential cooperation as an explanation for underdevelopment, quantity-based responses to externalities, and punishments carried out by our criminal justice system
I’d love a post from one of you about the TV show Pluribus, and the issue of cooperation costs seems especially relevant. The conceit of the show is that some event (perhaps a virus) connects everyone in the world together except ~ a dozen people who remain human. The connected—8 billion people minus 12–can communicate among themselves with no friction, have complete knowledge, and optimize for the collective. For example, because at least one of the collective knows how to fly an airplane, all 8 billion now possess that knowledge. That means, if there is a need to fly an airplane from Milan to Minsk, then the collective (likely) selects the person best able to do it (probably whatever able bodied person is close to an airplane in Milan). It’s a fascinating conceit that teases on many of the assumptions in economic models.
Great post (all your posts bring new and meaningful insights).
I was particularly interested in the area of crime and punishment. I love reading David Friedman on this subject and Michael Huemer as well (see Justice before the Law). This might be off the mark but it would seem to me that incarceration of nonviolent criminals would be more costly to individuals in almost all cases.
First, there’s the expense of building more prisons and staffing them. Next, there’s the cost of feeding prisoners and providing medical care. Finally, there’s the loss of each prisoner’s productivity (to GDP), not to mention the further negative costs because most felons don’t become law abiding citizens and instead become “real” criminals.
I’m sure that the response to my thought process begins with “potential cooperation” and includes “exploitation” and somewhere works in the impracticality of objectivity in criminal justice. But I would be most interested in your thoughts.
I think that there are two separate issues here. The first is whether we should treat nonviolent crime differently than violent crime. The second is about the social cost of prisons.
On the latter point, this is what Thompson is getting at. It would seem that the optimal solution would be to have the criminal pay a fine. We typically don't have them pay a fine. We typically put them in prison. However, prison not only means forgoing the fine, but it also means a cost to both the prisoner and the state. Why would we take a socially costly activity and seemingly make it more socially costly? His answer is that the fine system assumes everyone behaves honestly and honorably in the criminal justice system. So yes, even though prison is costly to both the prisoner and the state, it removes incentives for over-criminalization, bribery, and framing innocent people.
On the violent versus non-violent crime, I think that your point is that there might be some benefit to society from removing violent criminals from society by putting them in prison and so the social cost of imprisoning violent criminals is less than the social cost of imprisoning nonviolent criminals. I think that is correct. I think that we should see this reflected in the severity of punishments. For example, driving over the speed limit is a crime, but we typically do not put people in prison for such things. We have them pay a fine. Broadly, I think that we see nonviolent crimes subject to less time in prison (in some cases, avoid prison completely) and I think this is due to differences in social cost -- both the social cost of the crime and the social cost of the punishment. But perhaps I've misunderstood your point. If so, let me know.
I’d love a post from one of you about the TV show Pluribus, and the issue of cooperation costs seems especially relevant. The conceit of the show is that some event (perhaps a virus) connects everyone in the world together except ~ a dozen people who remain human. The connected—8 billion people minus 12–can communicate among themselves with no friction, have complete knowledge, and optimize for the collective. For example, because at least one of the collective knows how to fly an airplane, all 8 billion now possess that knowledge. That means, if there is a need to fly an airplane from Milan to Minsk, then the collective (likely) selects the person best able to do it (probably whatever able bodied person is close to an airplane in Milan). It’s a fascinating conceit that teases on many of the assumptions in economic models.
I haven't seen the show, but I'm intrigued. Thank you for the suggestion.
Great post (all your posts bring new and meaningful insights).
I was particularly interested in the area of crime and punishment. I love reading David Friedman on this subject and Michael Huemer as well (see Justice before the Law). This might be off the mark but it would seem to me that incarceration of nonviolent criminals would be more costly to individuals in almost all cases.
First, there’s the expense of building more prisons and staffing them. Next, there’s the cost of feeding prisoners and providing medical care. Finally, there’s the loss of each prisoner’s productivity (to GDP), not to mention the further negative costs because most felons don’t become law abiding citizens and instead become “real” criminals.
I’m sure that the response to my thought process begins with “potential cooperation” and includes “exploitation” and somewhere works in the impracticality of objectivity in criminal justice. But I would be most interested in your thoughts.
Thank you as always.
I think that there are two separate issues here. The first is whether we should treat nonviolent crime differently than violent crime. The second is about the social cost of prisons.
On the latter point, this is what Thompson is getting at. It would seem that the optimal solution would be to have the criminal pay a fine. We typically don't have them pay a fine. We typically put them in prison. However, prison not only means forgoing the fine, but it also means a cost to both the prisoner and the state. Why would we take a socially costly activity and seemingly make it more socially costly? His answer is that the fine system assumes everyone behaves honestly and honorably in the criminal justice system. So yes, even though prison is costly to both the prisoner and the state, it removes incentives for over-criminalization, bribery, and framing innocent people.
On the violent versus non-violent crime, I think that your point is that there might be some benefit to society from removing violent criminals from society by putting them in prison and so the social cost of imprisoning violent criminals is less than the social cost of imprisoning nonviolent criminals. I think that is correct. I think that we should see this reflected in the severity of punishments. For example, driving over the speed limit is a crime, but we typically do not put people in prison for such things. We have them pay a fine. Broadly, I think that we see nonviolent crimes subject to less time in prison (in some cases, avoid prison completely) and I think this is due to differences in social cost -- both the social cost of the crime and the social cost of the punishment. But perhaps I've misunderstood your point. If so, let me know.
Josh,
Thank you for your thoughtful response. You understood my point completely.
Happy New Year!